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Abstract
Based on market expectations reported by the Central Bank of Brazil for the SELIC interest rate, the IPCA inflation, the exchange
rate (BRL/USD) and the growth rate of industrial production for four different forecasting horizons, this work analyzes the term
structures of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of these variables. It also investigates the driving factors of
disagreement, paying special attention to the influence of monetary authorities’ credibility. An extensive regression analysis shows
that the levels of the term structures of disagreement are negatively related to the output gap (although this result is not very robust);
and that the levels of the term structures of disagreement in expectations about the IPCA inflation rate and the SELIC interest rate
have a strong negative relationship with central bankers’ credibility; this relationship is positive in the case of the growth rate of
industrial production.
© 2016 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
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Resumo
Com base nas expectativas de mercado divulgadas pelo Banco Central do Brasil para a taxa de juros (SELIC), a inflac¸ão medida
pelo IPCA, a taxa de câmbio (R$/US$) e a taxa de crescimento da produc¸ão industrial para quatro diferentes horizontes de previsão,
este trabalho analisa as estruturas a termo das divergências de expectativas quanto aos valores futuros dessas variáveis. Ele também
investiga os fatores determinantes das divergências, em especial, a influência da credibilidade da autoridade monetária. Uma extensa
análise de regressão mostra que os níveis das estruturas a termo das divergências são negativamente relacionados com o hiato do
produto (embora este resultado não é muito robusto); e que os níveis das estruturas a termo das divergências nas expectativas sobre a
taxa de inflac¸ão (IPCA) e a taxa de juros (SELIC) têm uma forte relac¸ão negativa com a credibilidade do banco central; esta relac¸ão
é positiva no caso de a taxa de crescimento da produc¸ão industrial.
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.  Introduction
Based on market expectations reported by the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) for the future behavior of the SELIC
nterest rate, the inflation rate (as measured by the IPCA index), the exchange rate (BRL/USD) and the growth rate of
ndustrial production for four different forecasting horizons, this work studies the dynamics of the term structures of
isagreement in expectations regarding the future values of these variables. It also investigates the factors that explain
heir behavior, especially the role played by the credibility of monetary authorities and the business cycle. In an inflation
argeting regime as the one prevailing in Brazil since June 1999, credibility can be measured according to the capacity
f targets pursued by monetary authorities to attract inflation expectations.
The main results of the paper are: (i) the term structures of disagreement in expectations are, on average, positively
loped, with the exception of the term structure of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of the growth
ate of industrial production, which is negatively sloped; (ii) the standard deviations of the four time series representing
isagreement about the future evolution of the growth rate of industrial production and the inflation rate decrease
ith the forecasting horizon; they increase with it in the case of the exchange rate (BRL/USD) and are insensitive
o it in the case of the SELIC interest rate; (iii) regressions relating the levels of the term structures of disagreement
n expectations to their potential macroeconomic determinants show that there is a negative relationship between the
ormer and either to with the output gap or our measure of monetary authorities’ credibility; (iv) the exception is the
evel of the term structure of disagreement in expectations about the growth rate of industrial production, which loads
ositively on our credibility index. These results support the idea that credible monetary authorities make inflation
xpectations converge to the targets they pursue, therefore reducing its dispersion.
Contributions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are novel not only in the Brazilian literature dedicated to economic studies,
ut also in the international literature devoted to emerging economies. The Brazilian literature lacks studies analyzing
he evolution of concrete measures of disagreement in expectations; furthermore, it lacks studies characterizing its
ypothetical dependence to the forecasting horizon or the specific variable being forecasted. Likewise, there are
o studies relating time series of disagreement measures to the observed paths of relevant macroeconomic variables.
inally, there is no research about the potential link between disagreement in expectations and Central Bank credibility.1
hus, results (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) fill some important gaps in the literature applied to Brazil, in particular, and emerging
conomies, in general.
Evidences (iii) and (iv) are also novel at the international level, since there are no studies relating the credibility of
onetary authorities in countries adopting the inflation targeting regime with disagreement in expectations concerning
he future values of macroeconomic variables. The analysis of the term structures of disagreement in expectations is
lso an important contribution, for the most important paper dealing with this issue (Andrade et al., 2014) does not
ink the common trends followed by the time series that comprise these curves (namely, their level) with their driving
actors.
The economic literature regarding disagreement in expectations (especially on the fields of macroeconomics and
nance) has emphasized the fact that agents may disagree about the future behavior of the economy. Although articles
iscussing expectations’ dispersion are numerous, we can classify them into four groups. The first group comprises
apers trying to characterize disagreement by means of time series, aiming at explaining its course in light of the
bserved behavior of potentially relevant macroeconomic variables (for example, the output gap and the volatility of
hocks affecting the economy), measures of the degree of independence of monetary authorities and their transparency
tandards.2 The second group includes articles studying the sources of disagreement in agents’ expectations, which can
tem from a priori heterogeneous beliefs, differences in the models used by agents to assess the economic environment,
ifferences in the information set that each agent uses to infer the current state of the economy, diversity of interpretations
bout new information revealed to the public, diversity of views about the nature of changes occurring in the economic
1 Garcia and Guillén (2014) do not assess the hypothesis that credibility changes may affect disagreement in expectations about future values of
nflation; also, the authors do not analyze the connection between credibility and disagreement in expectations concerning other macroeconomic
ariables (such as the growth rate of output).
2 In this group we can include Mankiw et al. (2003), Filardo and Guinigundo (2008), Ehrmann et al. (2010), Dovern et al. (2012), Siklos (2013)
nd Sill (2014).
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system (temporary vs. permanent changes) and so on.3 The third group discusses the consequences of expectations’
dispersion,4 while the fourth comprises articles that try to verify if specific disagreement measures are good proxies
for the inherent uncertainty of macroeconomic projections.5
Regarding the Brazilian economy, the fact that expectations are not the same for everyone has not received much
attention. There are articles (such as Bugarin and Carvalho, 2006; Guillén, 2008; Carvalho and Minella, 2009; Carvalho,
2012; de Paula and Nakane, 2013) that study the rationality of the process by which inflation expectations are formed
in Brazil and other Latin American economies (Chile and Mexico); the transmission mechanism determining the way
expectations spread in the Brazilian financial market (i.e. checking if this mechanism complies to the framework
proposed by Carroll, 20036); that compare sticky information and imperfect information models aiming at verifying
which one better describes the expectations formation process in Brazil; and that provide a comparison between central
tendency measures of inflation expectations distributions (more specifically, means, medians, modes and core inflation
measures) and the observed values of the inflation rate. The paper which comes closer to ours is Garcia and Guillén
(2014), who study inflation expectations distributions with the purpose of calculating a credibility index for the CBB
and then comparing it with other indices proposed in the Brazilian literature (Sicsú, 2002; Nahon and Meurer, 2005;
de Mendonc¸a, 2004; de Mendonc¸a and Souza, 2007, 2009).7
Besides this introduction, this article has four sections. Section 2 discusses concepts that are important in the study
of disagreement and presents the notation that we use throughout the paper. Section 3 presents some basic results
related to the term structures of disagreement regarding inflation expectations as measured by the IPCA, the SELIC
rate, the growth rate of industrial production and the exchange rate (BRL/USD). Section 4 studies the relationship
between disagreement in expectations and its potential macroeconomic determinants, paying special attention to the
measure of monetary authorities’ credibility proposed by de Mendonc¸a and Souza (2007, 2009). At last, Section 5
summarizes the main results of the paper and suggests some directions for future research.
2.  Deﬁnitions,  concepts  and  notation
The analysis of disagreement requires discussing a few concepts and presenting some notation: t  represents the
instant in which the forecast is made,8 i  identifies the agent responsible for the forecast (i  ∈  I, here I is the group of
agents surveyed; the number of agents in I is I), X  is the variable to be forecasted and Ei,tXa+j represents the forecast
calculated by the ith agent at time t about the value that variable X will take in the end of year a +  j. If j = 0, then Ei,tXa
represents the forecast about the value of X  in the end of the current year; if j = 1, then Ei,tXa+1 denotes the forecast about
the value of X  in the end of the next year and so on. The mean value of the distribution of expectations at t about the∑
value that X  will take in the end of year a +  j is given by EtXa+j =  1/I
I
Ei,tX
a+j
. The standard deviation of the same
3 The most prominent representatives of this group are Lahiri and Sheng (2008), Patton and Timmermann (2010), Wieland and Wolters (2011)
and Andrade et al. (2014).
4 Among these consequences we highlight the possible effects of disagreement on risk premiums embedded in market prices of financial assets
(Soderlind, 2009; Wright, 2011; Carlin et al., 2012; Buraschi and Whelan, 2012; Ehling et al., 2012), as well as its potential to prove more inertia
to price inflation (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Woodford, 2003; Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2009); affect the probability of regime changes in the
economy (Badarinza and Buchmann, 2011); induce cyclical fluctuations without changes in fundamentals (Lorenzoni, 2009; Rondina and Walker,
2012; Angeletos and La’O, 2013); encourage the formation of speculative bubbles and abrupt movements in asset prices (Scheinkman and Xiong,
2003; Burnside et al., 2013); justify the failure of the expectations hypothesis to explain the yield curve behavior (Nimark, 2012); and explain the
failure of the hypothesis that one cannot predict the returns of a stock by means of indicators other than measures of its inherent risk, such as beta
(Hong and Stein, 2007).
5 In this group we can include Giordani and Söderlind (2003), Lahiri and Sheng (2010), Grimme et al. (2011), Conflitti (2011) and Rich et al.
(2012).
6 More specifically, the hypothesis to be verified is whether forecasts made by agents who perform better in terms of forecasting errors are taken
into accout by other agents in the economy.
7 The authors’ hypothesis is that, if a central bank enjoys full credibility, then there is no reason for an agent to be persistently pessimistic or
optimistic about central bank’s attitudes toward inflationary pressures. Thus, under full credibility, the probability of an agent to be optimistic
or pessimistic given that he (she) was pessimistic in the previous month is the same. However, if the central bank is not credible and agents are
heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs about the credibility of the referred institution, then there will be a greater persistence in the state of being
optimistic or pessimistic.
8 This instant is characterized by a specific date, namely, a day d, a month m and a year a.
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istribution at time t  is given by sdtXa+j =  1/(I  −  1)
∑
I
(Ei,tXa+j − EtXa+j)2. Emint Xa+j =  min(Ei,tXa+j,  i  ∈ I)
enotes the minimum value of the distribution, while Emaxt Xa+j =  max(Ei,tXa+j, i ∈ I) represents its maximum
alue. The range of the distribution is defined below:
RtX
a+j =  Emaxt Xa+j −  Emint Xa+j (1)
The range RtXa+j is the measure of disagreement that we use throughout the paper, as other measures require the
nowledge of the entire distribution of expectations.9 As told in the introduction, we work with forecasts for the IPCA
nflation rate (π), the SELIC interest rate (s), the exchange rate (BRL/USD) (e) and the growth rate of industrial
roduction (g), therefore X  = π, s, e, g.
Forecasts like Ei,tXa+j are known as ﬁxed  event  forecasts  because the time horizon until the end of year a  + j  decreases
s t  advances through a, the year in which expectations are computed. This issue is better understood by an example.
uppose that an agent, in March 2000, computes his expectation about the value of the inflation rate in the end of 2000.
n this case we can say that the time horizon of the forecast is 10 months because the first 2 months of 2000 have already
assed and inflation figures for both months are known. By the same line of reasoning, when this agent computes his
nflation expectation in September 2000 about the value of the inflation rate at the closing of 2000, the time horizon
f his forecast decreases to only 4 months. This pattern of decreasing forecasting horizons as t advances through the
ear brings about a seasonal behavior in disagreement measures based on fixed event forecasts, since expectations
ispersion tend to decrease as the forecasting horizon shrinks10 (see Appendix 2).
It is to avoid the seasonal behavior inherent to disagreement measures based on ﬁxed  event  forecasts  that most
rticles in the literature recur to ﬁxed  horizon  forecasts, in which the forecasting horizon does not vary with the passage
f time.11 As proposed in Dovern et al. (2012), the conversion of ﬁxed  event  forecasts  into ﬁxed  horizon  forecasts  is
ccomplished by applying the formula below:
EtX
12(j+1) = 12 −  (m  −  1)
12
EtX
a+j + m  −  1
12
EtX
a+j+1,  j  =  0,  1,  2,  3,  .  . .  (2)
In Eq. (2), m  represents the month in which the forecast is made (or the month containing t) and EtX12(j+1) denotes
he average of agents’ expectations about the value that variable X  will take in the end of the next 12(j  + 1) months. The
ame formula is used to interpolate minimum and maximum forecasts, which are put into (1) to compute the values
f the disagreement measure RtX12(J+1). In the end of the process we obtain something that resembles a term structure
f disagreement in expectations, which is comprised by the “vertices” RtX12, RtX24, RtX36, etc. Given the fact that the
BB discloses forecasts for the current year, the next year and the following 3 years, formula (2) can be used with
 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4; therefore, we can always interpolate forecasts for the fixed time horizons of 12, 24, 36 and 48 months.
.  Characterizing  the  term  structures  of  disagreement
Data on expectations were retrieved from the CBB’s Market Expectations System (www.bcb.gov.br/expectativa),
hich is managed by the Department of Investor Relations and Special Studies (GERIN). Every weekday the GERIN
ollects forecasts from market participants (which can be financial institutions, real sector companies and consulting
rms) and handles individual data aiming at building distributions of expectations and computing their basic statistics
mean, median, minimum and maximum values, standard deviations and coefficients of variation). Forecasts are
xed-event ones and refer to the closing of the current year, the next year and the three years that follow.
9 Such information is not provided by the CBB. We are aware of the fact that papers on disagreement often use other measures, such as the
nter-quartile range and Kulback-Liebler divergence measure. These two options, though, cannot be calculated without the entire distribution of
ndividual forecasts. The standard deviation is also frequently used as a measure of disagreement, but we show in Appendix 1 that our measure
RtXa+j) and sdtXa+j provide similar results.
10 Indeed, the disagreement measure observed in March 2000 for the value that the inflation rate will take in the end of 2000 tends to be greater
han the disagreement measure observed in September 2000 for the value that the same variable will take at the closing of 2000. The divergence
easure tends to increase again in March 2001, since the current year becomes 2001 and the time horizon of the forecast becomes 9 months once
ore.
11 For example, Mankiw et al. (2003), Patton and Timmermann (2010) and Dovern et al. (2012).
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Statistics of distributions are published daily, allowing to follow the evolution of the “market consensus” (i.e. the
average and the median values of the distributions) and the dispersion around the central tendency. Dispersion is
measured by the range (i.e. the distance between the maximum and the minimum values reported by agents) and the
standard deviation of the distributions. However, there are some warnings that have to be made regarding the quality
of the data informed by agents. Both reported individual expectations and statistics derived from their distributions
are subject to abrupt changes in values, which tend to occur on some specific dates. The causes of these “jumps” and
“breaks” are: (i) the routine of updating forecasts on Friday, which is the last day of the week available to insert a valid
forecast to be published in the so-called Focus Report12; (ii) the routine of updating forecasts in some specific dates
(the reference dates); if an institution does not insert any valid information (i.e. reported in the last 30 days) until the
reference date, then its research department is excluded from the Top  513; and (iii) the possibility of agents revising
their expectations right after the release of some key economic and financial indicators.14
The measure of disagreement described in (1) is computed daily for each variable and interpolated to the forecasting
horizons of interest by means of (2). Daily results are converted into monthly averages in order to mitigate the “jumps”
and “breaks” described in the previous paragraph. This conversion is also justified because macroeconomic series
that potentially influence the dynamics of disagreement are mostly observed on a monthly basis. Data were collected
between November 2001 and August 2014. We consider disagreement regarding the SELIC interest rate, the IPCA
inflation rate, the exchange rate (BRL/USD) and the growth rate of industrial production. The maximum and minimum
values reported by agents are used to compute four Rt measures for each variable, which refer to the one-year ahead,
two-years ahead, three-years ahead and four-years ahead forecasting horizons. Therefore, we are able to obtain 16
time series representing the evolution of disagreement; each time series has 154 observations. This procedure allows
computing four term structures of disagreement in expectations deriving from Brazilian raw data, which are studied for
the first time in the Brazilian economic literature. It is worth mentioning that the properties of these term structures are
important in various fields, such as the study of the reasons why agents have different expectations (see, for instance,
Patton and Timmermann, 2010).
3.1.  Analysis  of  the  term  structure  of  disagreement  in  expectations  about  inﬂation  (Rtπ)
Fig. 1 shows the trajectories followed by Rtπ12, Rtπ24, Rtπ36 and Rtπ48 between November 2001 and August 2014.
Disagreement in inflation expectations rises strongly in late 2002, falling abruptly during 2003. This period coincides
with the uncertainties brought about by the possibility that the candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva would win the
presidential elections of 2002. Values taken by disagreement measures since 2004 vary between 1 and 4, that is, the
distance between the maximum and the minimum values recorded for the four time series neither exceed 4 percentage
points or are less than 1 percentage point. We can observe that the four time series follow similar paths and that there
are periods in which the time series corresponding to Rtπ48 rovers above (below) Rtπ12; in other words, the spread
between long term and short term disagreement becomes positive (negative). Positive spreads can be seen between
2005 and 2008, while negative values prevail in 2010.
Table 1 shows some basic statistics of Rtπ12, Rtπ24, Rtπ36 and Rtπ48, which are calculated for the same time period.
The information shown in Table 1 helps to characterize the main properties of the term structure of disagreement in
expectations about future inflation, which is one of the goals of our paper. The average values of the four time series
increase with their forecasting horizon (meaning that the average term structure is positively sloped), while standard
12 The “Focus - Market Report” is published every Monday morning.
13 Trying to improve the predictive power of research participants, to acknowledge their analytical effort and to induce them to reveal their true
expectations, the CBB elaborates the so-called Top 5 ranking. The Top 5 is a rating system based on the accuracy rate for three different forecasting
horizons (short, medium and long term). The variables for which the CBB prepares and publishes Top 5 rankings are the inflation rate (as measured
by the IPCA, the IGP-DI and the IGP-M indices), the SELIC rate and the exchange rate (BRL/USD). The existence of three valid forecasts (i.e.
reported in the last 30 days) for a given month or year in the last reference date (or couple of dates, in the case of the SELIC rate and the exchange
rate) constitutes a condition that must be fulfilled in order to take part of the monthly ranking. Even the GERIN recognizes that “... there is a higher
frequency of updating information ... in these reference dates” (taken from the article “Market Expectations System”, which is part of the ¨Frequently
Asked Questionss¨eries).
14 For example, the release of the IPCA-15 for a given month (say, January 2014) and the observation that this number has exceeded the level
expected by the market can affect the expectations for the IPCA inflation rate not only for January, but also for the following months and the IPCA
inflation rate at the closing of 2014.
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Fig. 1. Trajectories of the measures of disagreement in expectations regarding the IPCA inflation rate between November 2001 and August 2014.
The time series representative of disagreement for 12-month ahead, 24-month ahead, 36-month ahead and 48-month ahead forecasting horizons are
depicted by blue, red, green and black lines, respectively.
Table 1
Basic statistics calculated for the four groups of four time series representing disagreement in expectations. Besides the heading, the first four lines
correspond to statistics calculated from divergence measures of exchange rate expectations, the next four lines correspond to disagreement measures
derived from inflation expectations and so on. Each line pertains to a given forecasting horizon, which can be 12, 24, 36 and 48 months ahead.
Columns 2 to 10 inform averages, medians, standard deviations, maximum and minimum values, skewness and kurtosis measures, the first order
autocorrelation and the twelfth order autocorrelation. Each time series contains 154 monthly observations taken from the period between November
2001 and August 2014.
Series Average Median Max Min Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis AC (1) AC (12)
R(e)
12 0.57 0.50 2.35 0.28 0.28 3.29 17.96 0.89 0.07
24 0.78 0.72 2.12 0.39 0.30 1.82 7.81 0.93 0.25
36 0.89 0.81 2.15 0.42 0.34 1.48 5.11 0.93 0.26
48 1.02 0.92 2.52 0.45 0.43 1.48 4.86 0.95 0.32
R(π)
12 2.36 1.83 12.58 1.15 1.83 3.78 18.32 0.91 0.08
24 2.63 2.13 11.46 1.32 1.72 3.26 14.46 0.92 0.12
36 2.69 2.27 11.58 0.93 1.67 3.00 13.93 0.92 0.26
48 2.74 2.50 7.43 1.00 1.40 2.08 7.29 0.95 0.35
R(s)
12 3.85 3.49 12.33 2.16 1.63 2.52 10.34 0.87 0.23
24 5.90 5.56 15.50 3.71 1.75 3.06 14.70 0.90 0.00
36 6.41 6.25 12.13 4.02 1.61 1.69 6.52 0.90 0.15
48 6.56 6.35 13.39 4.14 1.73 2.09 8.22 0.90 0.04
R(g)
12 4.49 3.87 13.08 1.68 2.15 1.73 6.19 0.88 0.18
24 4.14 3.67 10.45 2.00 1.58 1.41 4.85 0.86 0.23
36 4.06 3.77 8.30 2.07 1.30 0.95 3.23 0.87 0.31
48 3.97 3.64 7.49 2.11 1.20 0.85 3.11 0.89 0.32
d
o
f
aeviations decrease with the forecasting horizon. Skewness measures are all positive, meaning that the distributions
f the values observed throughout the period exhibit long right tails. Kurtosis measures are all above 3, being higher
or series pertaining to short forecasting horizons. All series are very persistent, as pointed out by their first order
utocorrelation (AC(1)).
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Fig. 2. Trajectories of the measures of disagreement in expectations regarding the SELIC interest rate between November 2001 and August 2014.
The time series representative of disagreement for 12-month ahead, 24-month ahead, 36-month ahead and 48-month ahead forecasting horizons are
depicted by blue, red, green and black lines, respectively.
3.2.  Analysis  of  the  term  structure  of  disagreement  in  expectations  about  the  SELIC  interest  rate  (Rts)
Fig. 2 shows the paths of Rts12, Rts24, Rts36 and Rts48 for the period starting in November 2001 and ending in August
2014. Disagreement in expectations about the future of the SELIC interest rate rises strongly in late 2002, falling sharply
throughout 2003. The reasons have already been discussed in the case of the disagreement in expectations about future
inflation. From 2004 onward the four time series oscillate inside the interval [2, 8], meaning that the distance between
their maximum and minimum values are never below 2 percentage points or above 8 percentage points. All series share
a common path, but there are periods in which Rts48 comes closer to Rts12 (for example, between the end of 2009 and
the beginning of 2010).
Table 1 shows some basic statistics of Rts12, Rts24, Rts36 and Rts48. Average values increase with the forecasting
horizon, while standard deviations remain approximately constant. Skewness measures are all positive, meaning that
the distributions of values observed throughout the period have a long right tail. Kurtosis measures are always above
3 and tend to be higher at short forecasting horizons. All four time series are quite persistent, as pointed out by their
first order autocorrelations (which are around 0.9).
3.3.  Analysis  of  the  term  structure  of  disagreement  in  expectations  about  the  growth  rate  of  industrial  production
(Rtg)
Fig. 3 shows the paths of Rtg12, Rtg24, Rtg36 and Rtg48, which are the time series corresponding to disagreement
in expectations regarding the future values of the growth rate of industrial production for four different forecasting
horizons (1, 2, 3, and 4 years ahead). Disagreement measures rise sharply between late 2008 and early 2009, fall right
after then and settle down at a slightly lower level than the one occupied before the jump. The increase in disagreement
measures reflects the international economic and financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in
the US in September 2008. From 2011 onward, disagreement measures vary between 2 and 6; this means that the
distance between the highest and the lowest expected values of the growth rate of industrial production never exceeds
6 percentage points or are short of 2 percentage points. As before, the four time series follow a common trend. There
are times in which Rtg48 comes closer to Rtg12 (for example, in the beginning of 2014) and there are times when the
opposite occurs (for example, between 2008 and 2010).
Table 1 shows some basic statistics of the four time series Rtg12, Rtg24, Rtg36 and Rtg48. Unconditional means
and standard deviations decrease with the forecasting horizon, skewness measures are always positive and kurtosis
measures always exceed 3, being higher at short forecasting horizons. The four time series are quite persistent, as
indicated by their first order autocorrelations.
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Fig. 3. Trajectories of the measures of disagreement in expectations regarding the growth rate of industrial production between November 2001 and
August 2014. The time series representative of disagreement for 12-month ahead, 24-month ahead, 36-month ahead and 48-month ahead forecasting
horizons are depicted by blue, red, green and black lines, respectively.
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Fig. 4. Trajectories of the measures of disagreement in expectations regarding the BRL/USD exchange rate between November 2001 and August
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A014. The time series representative of disagreement for 12-month ahead, 24-month ahead, 36-month ahead and 48-month ahead forecasting horizons
re depicted by blue, red, green and black lines, respectively.
.4.  Analysis  of  the  term  structure  of  disagreement  in  expectations  about  the  exchange  rate  (Rte)
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the trajectories followed by the series Rte12, Rte24, Rte36 and Rte48, which measure the
isagreement in expectations about the future values of the exchange rate for four different forecasting horizons.
isagreement rises strongly in late 2002, remains high in early 2003 and reduces from there. There is also a significant
ncrease in late 2008, but the stress weakens after 2009. The reasons for these outbreaks have already been discussed:
rst, the credibility crisis triggered by the possibility that Lula could win the presidential election of 2002; second,
he disturbances caused by the international economic and financial crisis. Disagreement measures vary between 0.4
nd 1.2 from 2011 onward, meaning that the distances between the higher and the lower forecasts of the BRL/USD
xchange rate in the end of the four forecasting horizons are always below 1.20 R$/US$ and above 0.40 R$/US$. The
our time series share a common trend. Once more, there are periods in which Rte48 rovers next to Rte12 (for example,
n late 2010) and periods in which both series depart from each other (for example, throughout 2009).
12 24 36 48Table 1 shows some basic statistics of Rte , Rte , Rte and Rte , in an attempt of characterizing the main
roperties of this term structure. The unconditional means and standard deviations increase with the forecasting horizon.
symmetry measures are all positive and tend to be higher for shorter forecasting horizons. Kurtosis measures all exceed
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3 and also tend to be higher at short forecasting horizons. The four time series are very persistent, as suggested by their
first order autocorrelation.
3.5.  Summary  of  results
In summary, the average term structures of disagreement are all positively sloped, the exception being the term
structure of disagreement in expectations about the future values of the growth rate of industrial production, which is
negatively sloped on average. This fact could suggest that nominal variables are not firmly anchored in Brazil, leading
disagreement measures regarding inflation, the SELIC rate and the exchange rate to be higher at longer forecasting
horizons. On the other hand, one possible explanation for the fact that disagreement measures regarding the growth rate
of industrial production do not increase with the forecasting horizon is the action of some sort of reverting property,
i.e. the tendency of expectations to converge to a level determined by the natural growth rate of the economy – perhaps
this figure is less uncertain than, for instance, the long term inflation rate.
Mean values are always greater than medians, suggesting that all time series are subject to the occurrence of
exceptionally high values. This fact can be explained by periods of crisis or increased uncertainty in the economy,
as suggested by the graphical analysis. Asymmetry measures are higher for nominal variables (Rtπ, Rts, Rte) than
for real variables (Rtg); the same is true for kurtosis measures. Regarding standard deviations, they decrease with the
forecasting horizon in the cases of Rtg  and Rtπ, increasing with it the case of Rte  and being relatively insensitive to the
forecasting horizon in the case of Rts.
These results can be compared with those achieved by Patton and Timmermann (2010) and Andrade et al. (2014),
which are the only papers studying term structures of disagreement in expectations that we have found in our research.
The first paper deals with distributions of expectations for the GDP growth rate and the inflation rate (as measured by the
CPI) at four different forecasting horizons (1 month, 6 months, 12 months and 24 months ahead). The authors conclude
that disagreement tends to be higher at longer forecasting horizons; that is, both term structures are positively sloped.
The second article analyzes the disagreement in expectations about the future values of the US federal funds rate, the
growth rate of output and the inflation rate (as measured by the CPI). Forecasting horizons start at one-year-ahead
forecasts and end in the range between 6 and 10 years ahead. The authors conclude that the average term structure
of disagreement about the growth rate of output is downward sloping; that the term structure of disagreement about
future inflation is flat; and that the term structure of disagreement in expectations about the future values of the US
federal funds rate is upward sloping.15
4.  Macroeconomic  determinants  of  disagreement  in  expectations
The main purpose of this section is to investigate the determinants of disagreement in expectations regarding the
future values of the IPCA inflation rate, the exchange rate (BRL/USD), the SELIC interest rate and the growth rate of
industrial production. This task is accomplished by estimating various regressions relating a measure of the general level
of disagreement in expectations to a bunch of potentially relevant macroeconomic variables, paying special attention
to the output gap and an index of monetary authorities’ credibility. Instead of working directly with the disagreement
measures analyzed in Section 3 (each one pertaining to a specific forecasting horizon ranging from one to four years
ahead), in this section we use a measure of the general level of the term structure of disagreement in expectations.
More specifically, the explained variable in all regressions is the first principal component extracted from the original
set of four time series comprising each term structure, which is a good proxy for the common trend followed by them.
We have seen in Section 3 that this common trend is very important because it tends to attract the dynamics of the
underlying time series.
The application of this technique has a long tradition in the study of conventional yield curves (see Litterman and
Scheinkmann, 1991), which justifies its application to the term structures that we study here; it also serves as another
15 It should be emphasized that comparing these results with ours is not straightforward. Patton and Timmermann do not use the same disagreement
measure, as they have access to the entire distribution of individual data. In the case of Andrade et al. (2014), the authors use fixed event forecasts
for forecasting horizons up to two years. Thus, a two-years ahead forecast can be actually a six-quarters ahead forecast if it was taken from a survey
released in the mid-year. In addition, the disagreement measure adopted by the authors is the distance between the mean values of the ten highest
and lowest forecasts.
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ttempt to smooth the jumps and breaks that potentially contaminate our measure of disagreement, which is subject
o outliers (see (1)). Indeed, a sudden move of the time series representing, say, the disagreement in expectations
revailing at the one-year ahead forecasting horizon should not be considered an outlier if the same kind of abrupt
ove is also observed at the same time in the dynamics of the other time series representing disagreement. One can
xpect that this sort of systematic movement, which is important from the economic point of view, is captured by the
rst principal component, while erratic movements are filtered out. Thus, the dependent variables in the regressions
e estimate are the levels (or the first principal components) of the term structures formed by RtX12, RtX24, RtX36
nd RtX48, which are denoted by l(RtX12, RtX24, RtX36, RtX48) = lt(X), being X = π, s, e, g. Taking this notation into
ccount, the regressions that we estimate are the following:
lt (X) = β0 +  β1gapt +  β2credt +  εlt (3)
lt (X) = β0 +  β1gapt +  β2credt +  β5dat +  β6det +  β7dst + εlt (4)
lt (X) = β0 +  β1gapt +  β2credt +  β3Xt +  β4vol (Xt) +  εlt (5)
lt (X) = β0 +  β1gapt +  β2credt +  β3Xt +  β4vol (Xt) +  β5dat +  β6det +  β7dst +  εlt (6)
According to (6), which is the equation that incorporates the largest number of driving factors, the general level of
he term structure of disagreement in expectations about the future values of the variable X at time t (lt(X)) depends on
 measure of the output gap (gapt)16; a proxy  for the credibility of monetary authorities (credt); the level of the variable
eing forecasted at time t (Xt); a proxy  for the volatility of variable X  (vol(Xt)), which captures the magnitude of the
hanges that affected X  between t −  1 and t; and three dummy  variables (dat , det and dst ). The dummy dat equals 1 in
ovember and December 2001, taking value 0 otherwise; its purpose is controlling the effects exerted by the Argentine
risis. The dummy det takes value 1 between June 2002 and March 2003, being equal to 0 otherwise; its purpose is
ontrolling the effects of the confidence crisis triggered by the possibility that the candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
ould win the 2002 presidential elections in Brazil. Finally, the variable dst equals 1 between September 2008 and June
009, taking value 0 in the rest of the sample; this dummy variable captures the immediate consequences of the crisis
rompted by the breakdown of the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers.
The main result we seek is that the enhancement of monetary authorities’ credibility brings about a decrease in the
ispersion of market expectations regarding the future values of variables such as inflation and the overnight interest
ate. In an inflation targeting regime, a possible proxy  for the credibility of monetary authorities is the difference
etween the “market consensus” for future inflation and the target pursued by the central bank. If central bankers are
redible, then (i) the market consensus for future inflation converges to the target, and (ii) the target acts as a focal point
ttracting inflation expectations, narrowing the distribution of individual expectations. The second result we wish to
how is that disagreement is countercyclical in nature, confirming the conclusions of Dovern et al. (2012) regarding
isagreement in expectations about the future values of inflation and the 3-month interest rate in G7 countries.
We adopt the strategy of estimating regressions with an increasing number of explanatory variables, that is, firstly we
stimate regression (3), then regressions (4) and (5), and finally we estimate regression (6). We follow this procedure to
heck the robustness of our results; indeed, if the sign, the magnitude and the statistical significance of the coefficient
ssigned to a certain explanatory variable do not change much as we move from (3) to (6), then we should conclude
hat the estimated effect of this variable on lt(X) is robust. We pay special attention to the coefficients β1 and β2, which
easure the effects that the output gap and the credibility index exert on the general level of disagreement. Regression
3) was estimated taking credt and gapt as explanatory variables. Regression (5) adds two controls, which are the level
ccupied by the variable being forecasted (Xt) and a measure of its recent volatility (vol(Xt)). Both controls were used
y Mankiw et al. (2003) in their analysis of the driving factors of disagreement in inflation expectations.17 Regression
4) was estimated after inserting the dummy variables dat , det and dst in the original set of explanatory variables. The
16 The output gap is calculated by means of the first principal component of a set of three specific gap measures. The gap of GDP derives from the
eries of GDP at current prices, which is seasonally adjusted by the X12 method, deflated by the IPCA inflation index and then divided by potential
DP. Potential GDP comes from the original GDP series after being processed by the Hodrick–Prescott filter. Analogous procedures are applied to
he industrial production index and the IBC-Br, generating the other two measures of output gap.
17 Expectations were taken from three different sources, namely, Michigan, Livingston and SPF. The last two focus on expert forecasts, while the
rst one addresses forecasts made by the general public.
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role of these dummies is taking into account the possibility that the occurrence of strong shocks could force the central
bank to tolerate some deviation between inflation expectations and the target pursued by monetary authorities without
necessarily deteriorating their credibility.18,19 Regression (6) has already been discussed.
The credibility index is computed according to de Mendonc¸a and Souza (2007, 2009). The index equals 1 if the
median of the distribution of inflation expectations for the next 12 months
(
Etπ
12)20 coincides with the target pursued
by monetary authorities for the same period (πtrgtt ). The value of the credibility index decreases as the distance between
Et
(
π12
)
and πtrgtt increases; it becomes zero when Et
(
π12
)
<  πinft or when Et
(
π12
)
>  π
sup
t . The upper and lower
bounds πsupt and πinft derive from the limits of the band assigned by the National Monetary Council for the inflation
rate to be observed at the closing of the current and the next year. Formalizing this measure in mathematical terms:
credt =
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0 if Et
(
π12
) ≥  πsupt or Et
(
π12
) ≤ πinft
(7)
The inflation target specified for the next 12 months is computed by means of a formula similar to (2), that is:
π
trgt
t =
12 − (m  −  1)
12
π
trgt,a
t +
m  −  1
12
π
trgt,a+1
t (8)
In (8), m  represents the month in which the target for the next 12 months is calculated (or the month containing time
t), πtrgt,at denotes the inflation target pursued by monetary authorities for the current year (or the year containing time
t) and πtrgt,a+1t is the target specified for the year that follows. Formula (8) was also used to interpolate the upper and
lower limits of the bands that are fixed around the targets set by the National Monetary Council.
Regressions (3)–(6) are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and the gener-
alized methods of moments (GMM). In all three cases we use the Newey-West estimator to provide an estimate of
the covariance matrix of the parameters even in the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error
terms. In the cases of 2SLS and GMM, the variable credt is replaced by two instruments, credendt−1 and credendt−2. The
variable credendt is the time series formed by the credibility measures calculated by applying formulas (7) and (8) to
the last working day of each month. The usage of instruments in this case is mandatory because credt is based on the
first moment of the distribution of inflation expectations, which is probably contemporaneously affected by the same
shocks hitting disagreement measures, that essentially reflect second order moments of the same distribution (in other
words, shocks affecting the entire distribution of expectations also impact instantaneously its moments of first and
second order).The variables gapt, Xt and vol  Xt do not necessarily require instruments because a shock in the general level of
disagreement in expectations (which essentially reflects the opinions of experts regarding the future values of X) do not
affect them at the same time. This identification hypothesis stems, for example, in the model proposed by Carroll (2003),
which holds that the projections made by experts spread slowly in the population in a way that resembles a disease.
According to this model, a shock that hits the distribution of experts’ expectations does not affect contemporaneously
18 One can only speculate that a credible central bank can smooth the negative effects of shocks, allowing more pronounced and/or more persistent
deviations between inflation expectations and the target pursued by the institution. On the other hand, central bankers who lack credibility are forced
to halt significant deviations between expectations and targets.
19 The dummy variable dat aims at controlling for the possibility that the credibility loss observed in November and December 2001 is even greater
than the one indicated by the credibility measure credt.
20 Et(π12) is available at https://www3.bcb.gov.br/expectativas/publico/consulta/serieestatisticas.
L.V. Oliveira, A. Curi / EconomiA 17 (2016) 56–76 67
Table 2
Estimation results of regressions (3)–(6) by OLS, 2SLS and GMM. The explained variable is the level of the term structure of disagreement in
expectations about future inflation (lt(π)). The statistical significance is indicated as following: * (**, ***) means a significance level of 0.10 (0.05,
0.01). Standard deviations of the coefficients are written in quotes. “C” denotes the constant of the regression; “Adj R2” denotes the Adjusted R2
measure of goodness-of-fit. The sample contains 150 observations taken from the period between January 2002 and June 2014. Estimations were
made by means of the Newey-West estimator to preserve inference against the negative effects of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error
terms. The variable “credt” is our proxy for monetary authorities’ credibility; it is calculated as the mean values, in each month, of daily observations
of the credibility measure described in (7). We replace “credt” by its instruments “credendt−1” and “credendt−2” when estimating the regressions by 2SLS
and GMM. The instruments are the first and second lags of the series formed by the values of the credibility measure observed in the last day of
each month. The “gapt” variable denotes the output gap, while the dummy variables are dat , det and dst , respectively.
lt(π) C Gapt Credt da de ds πt (Vol)π Adj R2
OLS 2.82** −0.13 −4.81*** 0.42
{1.15} {0.10} {1.62}
1.72** −0.23** −3.20*** −0.39 3.71** −1.16*** 0.61
{0.81} {0.11} {1.11} {0.36} {1.46} {0.38}
−1.60** −0.04 −1.65* 0.36*** 2.52*** 0.74
{0.78} {0.06} {0.85} {0.05} {0.23}
−1.61** −0.13*** −1.18* −0.44** 2.11* −1.04*** 0.32*** 1.76*** 0.80
{0.62} {0.05} {0.63} {0.17} {1.07} {0.19} {0.04} {0.19}
2SLS 2.80** −0.13 −4.77*** 0.42
{1.14} {0.10} {1.59}
1.74** −0.23** −3.24*** −0.40 3.69** −1.15*** 0.61
{0.81} {0.11} {1.11} {0.37} {1.46} {0.37}
−1.86*** −0.03 −1.38* 0.38*** 2.55*** 0.74
{0.70} {0.06} {0.74} {0.06} {0.23}
−1.79*** −0.13*** −0.99* −0.41** 2.14* −1.06*** 0.33*** 1.77*** 0.80
{0.57} {0.05} {0.58} {0.16} {1.08} {0.19} {0.04} {0.20}
GMM 2.67** −0.05 −4.63*** 0.41
{1.16} {0.07} {1.62}
1.08 −0.14* −2.43** −0.11 4.14*** −0.89*** 0.59
{0.70} {0.08} {1.01} {0.30} {1.56} {0.27}
−1.84*** −0.03 −1.39* 0.37*** 2.55*** 0.74
{0.68} {0.06} {0.73} {0.05} {0.22}
−1.84*** −0.12*** −0.93* −0.42** 2.07* −1.06*** 0.34*** 1.79*** 0.80
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i.e. at the same month that the shock occurs) the expectations of other agents, therefore this shock does not affect
nstantaneously their pricing and production decisions, as well as other economic choices.21
In the next subsections we investigate the driving factors of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values
f the IPCA inflation rate (Section 4.1), the SELIC interest rate (Section 4.2), the exchange rate (Section 4.3) and the
rowth rate of industrial production (Section 4.4). As mentioned before, we are especially interested in studying the
elationship between the general level of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of each variable and
wo potentially relevant explanatory variables, the output gap and our measure of monetary authorities’ credibility.
.1.  Macroeconomic  determinants  of  disagreement  in  inﬂation  expectationsTable 2 shows the results achieved after estimating regressions (3)–(6) using the general level of the term structure
f disagreement in inflation expectations as the explained variable (lt(π)). The sample starts in January 2002 and ends
n June 2014; this holds for all regressions presented in Tables 2–5. The annual inflation rate observed in the last 12
21 In any case, the estimated values for the coefficients β1 and β2 (as well as their statistical significance) are relatively insensitive to the use of
onventional instruments replacing Xt and vol (Xt) (i.e. the first and second lags of both variables). Results achieved after estimating these regressions
ill not be discussed here due to space limitations, but they are available upon request.
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Table 3
Estimation results of regressions (3)–(6) by OLS, 2SLS and GMM. The explained variable is the level of the term structure of disagreement in
expectations about the future SELIC rate (lt (s)). The statistical significance is indicated as following: * (**, ***) means a significance level of 0.10
(0.05, 0.01). Standard deviations of the coefficients are written in quotes. “C” denotes the constant of the regression; “Adj R2” denotes the Adjusted
R2 measure of goodness-of-fit. The sample contains 150 observations taken from the period between January 2002 and June 2014. Estimations were
made by means of the Newey-West estimator to preserve inference against the negative effects of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error
terms. The variable “credt” is our proxy for monetary authorities’ credibility; it is calculated as the mean values, in each month, of daily observations
of the credibility measure described in (7). We replace “credt” by its instruments “credendt−1” and “credendt−2” when estimating the regressions by 2SLS
and GMM. The instruments are the first and second lags of the series formed by the values of the credibility measure observed in the last day of
each month. The “gapt” variable denotes the output gap, while the dummy variables are dat , det and dst , respectively.
lt(s) C Gapt Credt da de ds st Vol(st) Adj R2
OLS 2.26* −0.23** −3.87** 0.32
{1.22} {0.09} {1.70}
1.15 −0.29*** −2.34* 0.37 3.71** −0.45 0.52
{0.96} {0.11} {1.31} {0.43} {1.44} {0.43}
−0.16 −0.11* −2.57** 0.02 −0.01 0.63
{1.47} {0.05} {1.03} {0.23} {0.01}
0.78 −0.09 −1.74** −0.45 2.66** 0.25 −0.16 −0.01** 0.72
{1.13} {0.06} {0.77} {0.33} {1.27} {0.24} {0.17} {0.01}
2SLS 2.24* −0.23** −3.84** 0.32
{1.21} {0.09} {1.69}
1.18 −0.29*** −2.40* 0.35 3.68** −0.44 0.52
{0.96} {0.11} {1.32} {0.43} {1.43} {0.42}
−0.21 −0.10* −2.44** 0.02 −0.01 0.63
{1.48} {0.05} {1.01} {0.24} {0.01}
0.77 −0.09 −1.68** −0.44 2.68** 0.25 −0.17 −0.01** 0.72
{1.13} {0.06} {0.76} {0.33} {1.27} {0.24} {0.17} {0.01}
GMM 2.24* −0.23** −3.84** 0.32
{1.21} {0.09} {1.69}
0.88 −0.26*** −2.00* 0.47 3.65** −0.37 0.52
{0.78} {0.10} {1.10} {0.37} {1.45} {0.38}
0.15 −0.10* −2.87*** 0.02 −0.01 0.63
{1.48} {0.06} {0.96} {0.23} {0.01}
0.77 −0.08 −1.78** −0.45 3.32** 0.23 −0.15 −0.01** 0.71
{1.08} {0.06} {0.79} {0.34} {1.47} {0.23} {0.16} {0.01}months (πt−11,t) serves as a proxy  for the level of the inflation rate. The square of the difference between the inflation
rates observed in the current and the previous month (vol(πt)) serves as a proxy  for the magnitude of the shocks that
have affected the inflation rate between t −  1 and t.
We can observe that the Adjusted R2 measure achieved after estimating regression (6) is greater than 0.80 and
that all explanatory variables are statistically significant at conventional levels. The coefficient assigned to the level
of the IPCA inflation rate at time t  (β3) is positive, as well as the coefficient attached to the variability measure
vol (πt) (β4); both results indicate that the general level of disagreement in expectations about future inflation rises
when inflation rises and/or becomes more volatile. The uncertainties brought about by the 2002 elections induced
a significant increase in lt (π), while the crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the Argentine
crisis put a downward pressure on lt (π). There is negative relationship between the output gap and the general level of
disagreement in expectations about future inflation; in other words, lt (π) is counter-cyclical. The coefficient attached to
the measure of credibility proposed by de Mendonc¸a and Souza (2007) (β2) is negative, suggesting that an improvement
of the credibility of monetary authorities seems to reduce the general level of disagreement in expectations about future
inflation. These results are in line with those found in Dovern et al. (2012), who show that either a more robust economic
activity or a greater degree of independence enjoyed by the Central Bank exert a negative effect on the dispersion of
expectations regarding future inflation in G7 countries. This piece of evidence can be added to the arguments in
favor of adopting an inflation targeting regime, since it corroborates the idea that inflation expectations become better
anchored.
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Table 4
Estimation results of regressions (3)–(6) by OLS, 2SLS and GMM. The explained variable is the level of the term structure of disagreement in
expectations about the future exchange rate (lt(e)). The statistical significance is indicated as following: * (**, ***) means a significance level of 0.10
(0.05, 0.01). Standard deviations of the coefficients are written in quotes. “C” denotes the constant of the regression; “Adj R2” denotes the Adjusted
R2 measure of goodness-of-fit. The sample contains 150 observations taken from the period between January 2002 and June 2014. Estimations were
made by means of the Newey-West estimator to preserve inference against the negative effects of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the
error terms. The variable “credt” is our proxy for monetary authorities’ credibility. We replace “credt” by its instruments “credendt−1” and “cred
end
t−2”
when estimating the regressions by 2SLS and GMM. The “gapt” variable denotes the output gap, while the dummy variables are dat , det and dst ,
respectively.
lt(e) C Gapt Credt da de ds et Vol(et) Adj R2
OLS 1.44 −0.39*** −2.51 0.20
{1.10} {0.10} {1.51}
−0.08 −0.39*** −0.58 0.25 5.25*** 0.61 0.59
{0.58} {0.10} {0.79} {0.48} {1.03} {0.38}
−5.58*** −0.29*** 0.30 2.30*** 25.52*** 0.68
{1.18} {0.09} {0.61} {0.52} {6.55}
−4.51*** −0.33*** 0.58 0.12 2.84*** 0.21 1.69*** 17.36*** 0.75
{0.93} {0.10} {0.53} {0.42} {0.88} {0.39} {0.41} {4.59}
2SLS 1.39 −0.39*** −2.41* 0.20
{1.05} {0.10} {1.44}
−0.06 −0.39*** −0.62 0.24 5.23*** 0.62* 0.59
{0.58} {0.09} {0.78} {0.48} {1.04} {0.37}
−5.48*** −0.29*** 0.20 2.28*** 25.41*** 0.68
{1.21} {0.09} {0.64} {0.53} {6.50}
−4.40*** −0.33*** 0.46 0.10 2.82*** 0.24 1.67*** 17.15*** 0.76
{0.93} {0.10} {0.54} {0.42} {0.87} {0.40} {0.41} {4.59}
GMM 1.15 −0.40*** −2.12 0.20
{0.93} {0.09} {1.32}
0.02 −0.40*** −0.71 0.25 5.12*** 0.58 0.59
{0.54} {0.09} {0.74} {0.48} {1.00} {0.36}
−4.78*** −0.32*** 0.08 1.95*** 25.50*** 0.67
{0.95} {0.09} {0.62} {0.44} {6.82}
−4.36*** −0.32*** 0.35 0.22 2.80*** 0.30 1.67*** 16.93*** 0.76
{0.91} {0.10} {0.53} {0.42} {0.86} {0.41} {0.41} {4.63}
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oAn evaluation of the economic significance of the coefficients can be performed by taking into account that the
tandard deviation of the time series lt (π) equals 1.94. This means that the transition between a state in which there is
o credibility (therefore credt = 0) to a state in which central bankers enjoy full credibility (thus credt = 1) would make
he general level of disagreement in expectations regarding future inflation to fall by something around 0.5 standard
eviations – indeed, regressions of type (6) indicate that the modulus of the estimated value of β2 oscillate around 1.
egarding the effects of the output gap, estimated regressions of type (6) indicates that the coefficient β1 is statistically
ignificant at the 10% confidence level (this result does not depend on the estimation method) and takes values around
.12 in absolute terms. This result suggests that an one percentage point increase in the output gap would make the
eneral level of disagreement in expectations about future inflation to fall by approximately 0.05 standard deviations.
.2.  Macroeconomic  determinants  of  disagreement  in  interest  rate  expectations
Table 3 shows the results achieved after estimating regression (3)–(6) by OLS, 2SLS and GMM. The explained
ariable is the general level of the term structure of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of the
ELIC interest rate (lt(s)). The SELIC rate observed in the current month and expressed in annual terms (st) serves as
 proxy  for the level occupied by this variable, while the square of the difference between the SELIC rates observed in
he current and the previous month (Vol(st)) serves as a measure of the magnitude of the shocks that affected the path
f the interest rate between t −  1 and t.
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Table 5
Estimation results of regressions (3)–(6) by OLS, 2SLS and GMM. The explained variable is the level of the term structure of disagreement in
expectations about the future growth rate of industrial production (lt(g)). The statistical significance is indicated as following: * (**, ***) means
a significance level of 0.10 (0.05, 0.01). Standard deviations of the coefficients are written in quotes. “C” denotes the constant of the regression;
“Adj R2” denotes the Adjusted R2 measure of goodness-of-fit. The sample contains 150 observations taken from the period between January 2002 and
June 2014. Estimations were made by means of the Newey-West estimator to preserve inference against the negative effects of heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation in the error terms. The variable “credt” is our proxy for monetary authorities’ credibility; this variable is replaced by its
instruments “credend
t−1” and “cred
end
t−2” when estimating the regressions by 2SLS and GMM. The “gapt” variable denotes the output gap, while the
dummy variables are dat , det and dst , respectively.
lt(g) C Gapt Credt da de ds gt Vol(gt) Adj R2
OLS −1.75*** −0.25 2.99*** 0.20
{0.55} {0.20} {1.07}
−2.19*** −0.07 3.17*** 2.33*** 1.42** 2.81** 0.34
{0.51} {0.13} {1.04} {0.22} {0.59} {1.13}
−1.79*** −0.31* 2.83** 0.03 0.00 0.19
{0.58} {0.18} {1.09} {0.07} {0.00}
−2.21*** −0.26* 2.65*** 2.53*** 1.24** 3.71** 0.11* 0.00 0.37
{0.49} {0.13} {1.00} {0.31} {0.52} {1.42} {0.06} {0.00}
2SLS −1.71*** −0.25 2.91*** 0.20
{0.55} {0.21} {1.09}
−2.08*** −0.07 2.99*** 2.30*** 1.35** 2.85** 0.34
{0.52} {0.13} {1.04} {0.23} {0.59} {1.14}
−1.73*** −0.32* 2.72** 0.03 0.00 0.19
{0.59} {0.18} {1.12} {0.07} {0.00}
−2.06*** −0.26** 2.39** 2.49*** 1.13** 3.78*** 0.11* 0.00 0.37
{0.51} {0.13} {1.04} {0.32} {0.52} {1.44} {0.06} {0.00}
GMM −1.68*** −0.24 2.85*** 0.20
{0.54} {0.20} {1.05}
−2.04*** −0.06 2.86*** 2.32*** 1.33** 2.89** 0.34
{0.51} {0.14} {1.02} {0.23} {0.58} {1.14}
−1.72*** −0.31* 2.70** 0.03 0.00 0.19
{0.57} {0.18} {1.07} {0.07} {0.00}
−2.05*** −0.26* 2.28** 2.51*** 1.11** 3.90*** 0.12** 0.00 0.37
{0.50} {0.13} {0.97} {0.31} {0.51} {1.41} {0.05} {0.00}The adjusted R2 measure of goodness-of-fit is larger than 0.70 in all regressions of type (6), meaning that regressors
explain well the observed behavior of lt (s). According to the regression analysis, the variable credt is always statistically
significant at conventional confidence levels. The estimated sign of β2 is negative no matter the regression type or the
estimation method, implying that an improvement in the credibility of monetary authorities puts a downward pressure
on the general level of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of the SELIC rate. We can see that a
larger output gap tends to reduce lt (s), but this result is not as robust as the one pertaining to credt because the coefficient
attached to gapt is not statistically significant in regressions of type (6). Regarding the dummy variables dat , det and
dst , only the second one exerts a statistically significant effect on lt(s).  These results are in line with those reported
by Dovern et al. (2012), who show that either a more robust economic activity or a greater degree of independence
enjoyed by the Central Bank exert a negative effect on the dispersion of expectations regarding future values of the
3-month interest rates in G7 countries.
The economic importance of the estimated values of the coefficients β1 and β2 can be evaluated by considering that
the standard deviation of the time series lt (s) equals 1.85. This means that the transition between a state in which the
central bank has no credibility at all to another state in which monetary authorities enjoy full credibility would make
the general level of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of the SELIC rate to fall by at least 1
standard deviation. This conclusion comes from the fact that regressions of type (6) indicate that the modulus of ˆβ2
are often greater than 1.7. Regarding the effects of the output gap, estimated regressions of all types indicate that the
coefficient β1 is statistically significant in most of the cases. Estimated values are between −0.3 and −0.1, meaning
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hat an one percentage point increase in the output gap would make the general level of disagreement in expectations
bout future SELIC rates to fall by something between 0.05 and 0.16 standard deviations.
.3.  Macroeconomic  determinants  of  disagreement  in  exchange  rate  expectations
Table 4 shows estimation results achieved when one tries to relate the level of the term structure of disagreement
egarding the future values of the exchange rate (BRL/USD) with the credibility index of monetary authorities, the
utput gap and other explanatory variables. Regressions (3)–(6) are estimated by three different methods: OLS, 2SLS
nd GMM. The mean value of the exchange rate in each month is taken as a proxy  for the level occupied by the
xchange rate at time t, while the square of the difference between the mean values observed in the current and the
revious month (Vol(et)) serves as a measure of the magnitude of the shocks affecting the exchange rate between t  −  1
nd t.
The adjusted R2 measure of goodness-of-fit is never less than 0.70 in regressions of type (6), meaning that the
omplete set of regressors do well in explaining the observed behavior of the general level of disagreement in exchange
ate expectations. Results achieved after estimating regressions (3)–(6) show that the explanatory variables that exert a
tatistically significant effect on lt (e) at conventional confidence levels are the current level of the exchange rate itself
whose coefficient is positive), the magnitude of exchange rate changes (whose coefficient is also positive), the output
ap (which has a negative coefficient) and the dummy variable marking the elections held in 2002 (whose coefficient
s positive). The credibility measure has no statistically significant relationship with the general level of disagreement
n expectations regarding the future values of the exchange rate; this result holds for almost all estimated regressions.
We are not able to compare our results with other findings in the literature because the only paper focusing on
he interaction between the exchange rate and disagreement (Menkhoff et al., 2009) resorts to different explanatory
ariables. The economic importance of the coefficient attached to the output gap can be evaluated by considering that
he standard deviation of the time series lt (e) equals 1.92. Having this in mind, one can show that an increase of 1
ercentage point in the output gap forces the general level of the disagreement in expectations about the future values
f the exchange rate to fall by something around 0.2 standard deviations – this result comes from the fact that ˆβ1 varies
etween −0.3 and −0.4.
.4.  Macroeconomic  determinants  of  disagreement  in  expectations  about  the  growth  rate  of  industrial  production
Finally, Table 5 shows the results achieved after estimating regressions (3)–(6) and taking lt (g) as the explained
ariable. The growth rate of industrial production observed between the current month and the same month of the
revious year serves as a proxy for the level occupied by the growth rate of industrial production at time t, while
he square of the difference between the growth rates observed in the current month and the previous month, that is,
Vol(gt)), serves as a proxy  for the magnitude of the shocks affecting the growth rate of industrial production between
 −  1 and t.
The adjusted R2 measure of goodness-of-fit is never greater than 0.40, meaning that even the set of regressors used
n regressions of type (6) have a hard time in explaining the observed behavior of the general level of disagreement
n expectations regarding the growth rate of industrial production. The coefficients attached to the dummy variables
a
t , d
e
t and dst are all positive and statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. The coefficient assigned
o our measure of the credibility of monetary authorities is also positive, being statistically significant at conventional
onfidence levels in all regressions. The fact that ˆβ2 has a positive sign will be interpreted in the next subsection. At
ast, the coefficient attached to the output gap has a negative sign but is not statistically significant in all regressions.
When compared to other results found in the literature on disagreement, ours do not differ much. For example,
overn et al. (2012) find a negative coefficient attached to their measure of economic activity, but the relationship
s not statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. They also find that granting independence to central
ankers exert a negative influence on disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of the GDP growth rate;
n this case estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% confidence level. An economic assessment of
he estimated value of coefficient β2 can be performed if one considers that the standard deviation of the time series
orresponding to lt (g) equals 1.95. As regressions (3)–(6) indicate a coefficient whose magnitude is never below 2.5,
he transition between a state in which the central bank has no credibility to a situation in which monetary authorities
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enjoy full credibility would make the general level of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of the
growth rate of industrial production to increase by at least 1.2 standard deviations, which constitutes a sizable effect.
4.5.  Summary  of  results
In this subsection we make a general assessment of the results compiled in Sections 4.1–4.4, paying special attention
to their interpretation. We start the analysis discussing the role played by the dummy variables dat , det and dst . Regarding
the dummy variable marking the elections held in 2002, the coefficient attached to it (β6) (which was estimated in
regressions (4) and (6)) is statistically significant at conventional confidence levels no matter the disagreement measure
being explained (lt (π), lt (s), lt (e) or lt (g)) and the estimation method. All estimated values of β6 are positive and large,
ranging between 1 and 5; this suggests that political disturbances affecting the proper operation of economic policies
and decision making have a major impact on individual expectations and their dispersion. The coefficient attached to
the dummy variable dst (β7), which marks the effects of the subprime crisis, has a positive sign in regressions taking
lt (π) as the explained variable; this sign is negative in regressions explaining lt (g). These are the cases in which β7 is
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels.
At last, the coefficient attached to the dummy variable dat (β5, which marks the contagion of the Argentine crisis)
is positive and statistically significant at conventional confidence levels in the case of the growth rate of industrial
production. This result can be explained both by the connection between the two economies and the fact that dat
takes value 1 in a period also marked by the so-called blackout crisis. Thus, the problems in the production of
electricity observed between July 2001 and February 2002 would have affected not only the growth rate of the Brazilian
economy, but also agents’ expectations (and their disagreement) regarding the future level of economic activity and
their assessment about the costs in terms of declining production.
The coefficients assigned to the level of the variable being forecasted and its recent volatility (β3 and β4, respectively;
both coefficients are estimated in regressions (5) and (6)) are positive and statistically significant at conventional
confidence levels in the cases of the general level of the term structure of disagreement in expectations regarding
inflation and the exchange rate (BRL/USD). These results for inflation are in line with those found in Mankiw et al.
(2003) and Dovern et al. (2012).
The coefficient assigned to the output gap (β1) is always negative, meaning that the levels of the term structures of
disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of all variables hold a negative relationship with it. This effect
is statistically significant in most of the cases, being quite strong in the case of the exchange rate (in which the effect
is detected no matter the estimation method and the particular regression being estimated). Its economic importance,
though, does not seem to be as relevant as the one enjoyed by the measure of monetary authorities’ credibility.
The effects of increased credibility of monetary authorities are in line with what was anticipated in the cases of
the general level of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of IPCA inflation and the SELIC rate;
indeed, the estimated values of the coefficient β2 are negative in all regressions, regardless the estimation method. In
addition, β2 is statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. The reasons are very clear: if agents believe
that central bankers are committed to the inflation target they pursue, then expectations regarding future inflation tend
to converge to this target, reducing the dispersion of the distribution of individual point of views about the future
inflation path. Regarding the interest rate, the validity of the Fisher equation suggests that a higher concentration of
inflation expectations around the target helps reducing the disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of
the overnight interest rate.
Regarding the effects of increased credibility on disagreement in expectations about the future values of the growth
rate of industrial production, results are not in accordance with what was expected a priori. Indeed, results suggest that
enhancing the credibility of monetary authorities tends to increase disagreement in expectations regarding the future
values of the growth rate of industrial production. The fact that ˆβ2 has a positive sign can be interpreted if one pays
attention to the following arguments: first, under an inflation targeting regime, the loss function of central bankers puts
a much higher weight on deviations of expected inflation from its target than on deviations of the growth rate of output
from its natural growth path; second, our measure of monetary policy credibility increases when expected inflation
comes closer to the target; and third, agents do not know for sure the sacrifice ratio of the Brazilian economy, meaning
that they do not know the costs of reducing the misalignment between expected inflation and its target. The three
arguments suggest that central bankers who are successful in maintaining expected inflation near its target (therefore
minimizing their loss function) have to bear the side effect of increasing disagreement in expectations regarding the
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rowth rate of industrial production; indeed, since the costs of this policy in terms of growth are not well known,
gents’ divergence about future growth actually increases.
.  Conclusion
This article raises some stylized facts of the behavior of the term structures of disagreement in expectations regarding
he future values of the inflation rate, the SELIC interest rate, the exchange rate (BRL/USD) and the growth rate of an
ndex of industrial production. Raw data come from the CBB’s Market Expectations System, referring to the Brazilian
conomy throughout the period between November 2001 and August 2014. This period covers most of the Brazilian
nflation targeting regime, which started officially in June 1999. The term structures that we study comprise four
vertices”, each one pertaining to a given forecasting horizon (which can be of 12, 24, 36 or 48 months ahead). The
ain findings of this stage are the following: (i) the term structures of disagreement in expectations are, on average,
ositively sloped, with the exception of the term structure of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values
f the growth rate of industrial production, which is negatively sloped; and (ii) the standard deviations of the four
ime series representing disagreement regarding the future evolution of the growth rate of industrial production and the
nflation rate decrease with the forecasting horizon; they increase with it in the case of the exchange rate (BRL/USD)
nd are insensitive to it in the case of the SELIC interest rate.
The results of Sections 4.1–4.4 suggest that the levels of the four term structures of disagreement in expectations
ave a negative relationship with the output gap. This effect is statistically significant in most of the cases, being
ery strong (i.e. not depending on the specific regression being estimated or the estimation method) in the case of
isagreement in expectations regarding the exchange rate. This evidence highlights the importance of providing a solid
round for economic growth, since agents see less uncertainty and disagree less about future of the economy during
eriods of prosperity.
We also verify that the levels of the term structures of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of
nflation and the SELIC rate are negatively related to the index of monetary authorities’ credibility; this relationship
s positive in the case of the level of the term structure of disagreement in expectations regarding the future values of
he growth rate of industrial production. Results are not only statistically significant regardless the specific regression
eing estimated and the estimation method, but are also economically relevant. They reinforce the idea that credible
onetary authorities are able to anchor inflation expectations more firmly, allowing monetary policy to operate in
 better background and providing better results in terms of macroeconomic stabilization. The positive sign of the
oefficient attached to the credibility measure in the case of the general level of disagreement in expectations regarding
he future values of the growth rate of industrial production can be understood as a result of two interacting aspects of
he Brazilian economy, which are the inflation targeting regime adopted by the country since 1999 and the probable
ncertainty about the costs, in terms of economic activity, of reducing the misalignment between inflation and its target.
egarding future research, our discussion in Section 1 makes it clear that there is still much to do in the literature
pplied to emerging countries, particularly Brazil.
ppendix  1.  Correlation  between  two  alternative  measures  of  disagreement  in  expectations
This appendix compares the measure of disagreement in expectations used throughout this work, which is the range
f the distribution of individual expectations (notation: Rt
(
Xa+j
)), with the standard deviation of the same distribution
notation: sdt
(
Xa+j
)). The monthly series pertaining to the range is calculated as the average of the ranges observed
n a given month for the distributions of the values that agents expect that a given variable will take in the end of a
iven year. The same is done for the standard deviation.
Table 6 shows the results, where each row pertains to a specific variable and each column refers to a given year. Cells
nform the correlation between the two measures of disagreement in expectations, which are formed for the closure of
he year informed in the heading of the table. For example, the column referring to 2005 shows that the correlations
etween the series formed by the standard deviations and the ranges of the distributions of expectations for the closing
f 2005 are 0.9873 in the case of the exchange rate, 0.9818 in the case of the inflation rate and so on. The table shows
nly correlations calculated from a sample of at least 24 observations. The correlation coefficients are greater than 0.9
n most of the cases, which allows one to conclude that both measures provide similar results.
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Table 6
The table shows the correlation between measures Rt
(
Xa+j
)
and sdt
(
Xa+j
)
, which were calculated based on expectations for the end of each
year between 2003 and 2016. Variables are the exchange rate (e), the inflation rate as measured by the IPCA (π), the SELIC interest rate (s) and the
growth rate of industrial production (g).
Correl
(R(Xt),sd(Xt))
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
e 0.9873 0.9817 0.9658 0.9679 0.9575 0.9459 0.8748 0.9383 0.9079 0.9326 0.9463 0.8534 0.3136 0.5114
π 0.9818 0.9618 0.9663 0.9541 0.9803 0.9350 0.9069 0.9034 0.9476 0.9004 0.8895 0.9380 0.8826 0.9160
s 0.9377 0.9755 0.9824 0.9682 0.9579 0.9051 0.8806 0.9304 0.9104 0.9437 0.9310 0.8686 0.6043 0.7443
g 0.9405 0.8203 0.7254 0.8041 0.5135 0.6937 0.9026 0.9309 0.8609 0.9518 0.9614 0.9689 0.8327 0.9204
Appendix  2.  Seasonality  of  disagreement  in  ﬁxed  event  expectations
The regular variation of the forecasting horizon as time passes during the year, which is typical of fixed event
expectations, can create a seasonal pattern in time series of disagreement measures. This occurs because disagreement
tends to decrease with the forecasting horizon, a possibility implied by the arrival of information about the developments
of the economic variable being forecasted.
Table 7 serves to evaluate the hypothesis that the ranges of the distributions of individual expectations vary as a
function of a  and t. Some explanations are required to help reading the table. The columns of the table (except the one
identified by the title “Average”) indicate the year for which projections are being made. The column referring to 2005
shows the average values of the ranges of the distributions of expectations for the value that each variable takes at the
Table 7
Study the possibility of a seasonal pattern in the series of disagreement in expectation in fixed event. This regular variation occurs because the
disagreement in expectation tends to decrease as the prospective period decreases. Instructions to read the table are detailed in Appendix 2.
Average 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
R(e)
1 0.329 0.700 0.227 0.246 0.221 0.193 0.218 0.541 0.698 0.134 0.291 0.210 0.267
6 0.460 0.657 0.679 0.388 0.541 0.493 0.329 0.274 0.600 0.400 0.290 0.460 0.405
12 0.621 0.809 1.702 0.508 0.559 0.832 0.337 0.400 0.832 0.355 0.400 0.459 0.428 0.448
24 0.825 0.953 1.829 1.064 0.593 0.820 0.743 0.498 1.001 0.740 0.420 0.577 0.730 0.754
36 0.933 1.471 1.853 1.120 0.737 0.850 0.908 0.665 1.180 0.818 0.422 0.630 0.698 0.778
48 1.041 1.262 2.095 1.219 1.071 1.210 0.868 0.778 1.321 0.900 0.478 0.689 0.744 0.900
R(π)
1 0.909 5.122 0.839 0.600 0.398 0.486 0.584 0.608 0.344 0.577 0.334 0.484 0.534
6 1.720 1.606 4.692 1.947 1.398 1.233 1.324 1.697 1.439 1.485 1.295 1.138 1.392
12 3.046 2.824 13.257 2.211 3.795 1.955 1.538 2.089 2.173 1.641 2.203 1.955 2.493 1.470
24 2.974 2.910 11.293 3.185 2.650 1.945 2.800 2.126 1.644 1.565 1.591 2.500 2.800 1.657
36 3.041 2.743 11.600 3.685 3.350 2.000 2.000 2.050 1.420 1.615 1.600 2.800 2.500 2.171
48 2.820 3.207 7.000 3.685 3.350 2.264 2.500 2.000 1.420 2.040 1.700 2.500 2.500 2.500
R(s)
1 1.171 4.162 1.900 0.583 0.761 1.750 0.500 0.898 1.750 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.250
6 2.975 4.283 7.500 3.143 2.989 2.405 2.125 2.429 2.964 2.250 1.440 2.150 2.025
12 4.013 5.000 9.286 3.500 2.643 3.693 3.478 2.600 4.409 4.205 3.978 3.705 2.888 2.786
24 6.394 5.500 12.762 5.120 5.650 4.477 6.825 6.475 6.568 6.864 5.304 6.318 6.000 5.262
36 6.400 6.545 11.857 7.994 4.810 5.591 7.000 4.500 6.591 5.745 5.467 7.148 5.500 4.452
48 6.654 7.000 13.000 6.050 5.000 7.000 6.500 5.500 6.523 4.352 6.750 6.830 6.000 6.000
R(g)
1 2.719 3.809 2.670 2.493 2.134 3.289 3.753 2.065 5.615 2.617 1.867 1.103 1.212
6 4.468 3.760 3.075 4.727 5.409 2.654 4.450 2.205 9.416 4.618 3.448 6.938 2.916
12 4.305 7.121 4.628 4.300 4.581 3.764 2.980 2.010 5.077 9.099 4.000 3.932 2.409 2.067
24 3.326 4.480 3.000 2.910 3.500 4.500 2.920 3.745 3.445 4.955 2.368 3.163 1.800 2.455
36 4.057 5.834 4.230 4.800 3.500 4.000 4.170 7.595 3.832 4.000 2.742 3.200 2.380 2.453
48 3.402 3.231 4.000 3.300 3.000 4.600 3.300 4.095 4.232 4.991 2.000 3.700 2.280 1.500
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losing of the same year. The average disagreement in expectations observed in December 2001 (which is depicted in
he line marked by the number 48, since there is a 48-month distance between December 2001 and December 2005)
quals 1.26, 3.21, 7.00 and 3.23 in the cases of disagreement regarding the future values of the exchange rate, inflation,
nterest rate and the growth rate of industrial production, respectively. Disagreement measures become smaller in
ecember 2004 (which is depicted in the line marked by the number 12, since there is a 12-month distance between
ecember 2004 and December 2005), as roughly indicated by the figures of 0.56, 3.80, 2.64 and 4.58 that prevail in
he same cases; they shrink more in November 2005 (which is depicted in the line marked by the number 1, since there
s a 1-month distance between November 2005 and December 2005), as indicated by the figures of 0.22, 0.40, 0.76 and
.13 that prevail in the same cases. Following the same logic, the mean values observed in December 2002, December
003 and June 2004 are marked by the numbers 36, 24 and 6, respectively. We expect that, for each variable, the values
nformed in each column decrease as the number attached to the row decreases; more specifically, it is anticipated that
alues in rows marked by the number 48 are larger than those referring to the number 1.
The row identified by the title “Average” shows the mean values of each line, i.e., this column reports the average
f the numbers observed between 2002 and 2017 for each distance between the moment in which the projection is
ade and the year for which the projection is made. As previously described, these distances vary from 48 months
efore closing the year a up to 1 month before the close of the year a. It is expected that, for each variable, the observed
alues decrease in this column with the line number; More specifically, it is expected that the values contained in the
ow designated by the numeral 48 are larger than the values in the row identified by the number 1.
Results shown in Table 7 confirm the hypotheses formulated above. Indeed, for each variable, the values depicted
n each column decrease as the number assigned to the line decreases. This pattern is clear in forecasts made for the
losing of 2006 onwards. It is less clear in forecasts made for the closing of years before 2006, probably as a result of
he disruptive effects of the confidence crisis triggered by the possibility that the candidate Lula would win the 2002
lection. It is also true that, for each variable, the values informed in the column marked by “Average” decrease as
he number attached to the line decreases. This is especially true for exchange rate and interest rate forecasts, since
he referred values decrease monotonically as we move from line 48 to line 1. This is less true for inflation and the
rowth rate of industrial production forecasts, since informed values only take a clear downward trend from the line
esignated by the number 12 onwards. Anyway, the big picture confirms the idea that disagreement in expectations
ends to decrease as the forecasting horizon decreases.
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